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Abstract
It is well-known that linear dynamical systems with Gaussian noise and quadratic
cost (LQG) satisfy a separation principle. Finding the optimal controller amounts to
solving separate dual problems; one for control and one for estimation. For the discrete-
time finite-horizon case, each problem is a simple forward or backward recursion. In
this paper, we consider a generalization of the LQG problem with two controllers
and a partially nested information structure. Each controller is responsible for one of
two system inputs, but has access to different subsets of the available measurements.
Our paper has three main contributions. First, we prove a fundamental structural
result: sufficient statistics for the controllers can be expressed as conditional means
of the global state. Second, we give explicit state-space formulae for the optimal
controller. These formulae are reminiscent of the classical LQG solution with dual
forward and backward recursions, but with the important difference that they are
intricately coupled. Lastly, we show how these recursions can be solved efficiently,
with computational complexity comparable to that of the centralized problem.
1 Introduction
With the advent of large systems operating on a global scale such as the internet or power
networks, the past decade has seen a resurgence of interest in decentralized control. For
such large systems, it is inevitable that some control decisions must be made using only
local or partial information. Two natural questions that arise are:
1. Can the ever-growing information history be aggregated without compromising
achievable performance? In other words, what are sufficient statistics for the decision-
makers?
2. When and how can optimal decentralized policies be efficiently computed?
In this paper, we give complete answers to the above questions for a fundamental decen-
tralized control problem: the two-player partially nested LQG problem.
Briefly, our problem consists of two linear Gaussian systems with their own local con-
trollers. The systems are coupled. System 1 affects System 2 through its state and input
but not vice-versa, and the controller for System 1 shares its measurement with the con-
troller for System 2 but not vice versa. A formal description of the problem is given
in Section 3.
It is believed that decentralized control problems are likely hard in general [1, 16].
However, partially-nested LQG problems admit an optimal controller that is linear [3].
In decentralized control problems, partial nestedness is typically manifested in two ways:
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1. If a subsystem i affects another subsystem j, then the controller at subsystem i shares
all information with the controller at subsystem j. In other words, the information
flow obeys the sparsity constraints of the dynamics.
2. If subsystem i affects subsystem j after some delay d, then controller at subsystem i
shares its information with controller at subsystem j with delay not exceeding d. In
other words, the information flow obeys the delay constraints of the dynamics.
Several combinations of the above two manifestations of partial nestedness have been ex-
plored under state feedback assumptions. State feedback problems have been investigated
in [15] under sparsity constraints, in [5] under delay constraints and in [6] under a mixture
of delay and sparsity constraints. A state feedback problem where partial nestedness was
captured by a partial order on subsystems was investigated in [14].
The problem considered in this paper is an output feedback problem where controllers
observe noisy measurements of states. With only two controllers, it is perhaps the sim-
plest output feedback problem. However, as we shall see, having noisy measurements
introduces a nontrivial coupling between estimation and control and complicates the so-
lution significantly. An explicit solution to the continuous-time version of the two-player
problem as well as an extension to the broadcast case appeared in [7, 8, 9]. These works
use a spectral factorization approach that is completely different from the common in-
formation approach used herein. Furthermore, they solve the problem over an infinite
time horizon, which makes the coupling between estimation and control simpler due to
the steady-state assumption. A particular case of output-feedback partially nested LQG
problem namely the one-step delayed sharing problem was investigated in [13].
Our paper has three main contributions. In Section 4, we find sufficient statistics for
the two-player LQG problem. Our result relies on a common information based approach
developed in [10] and [11]. In Section 5, we give an explicit state-space solution to the
two-player problem using dynamic programming. Lastly, in Section 6, we show how to
efficiently compute the solution to the two-player problem, and show that it can be done
with computational effort comparable to that required for the centralized version of the
problem. Namely, computational effort is proportional to the length of the time horizon.
2 Notation
Real vectors and matrices are represented by lower- and upper-case letters respectively.
Boldface symbols denote random vectors, and their non-boldface counterparts denote
particular realizations. The probability density function of x evaluated at x is denoted
P(x = x), and conditional densities are written as P(x |y = y). We write x = N (µ,Σ)
when x is normally distributed with mean µ and variance Σ. This paper considers
stochastic processes in discrete time over a finite time interval [0, T ]. Time is indi-
cated using subscripts, and we use the colon notation to denote ranges. For example:
x0:T−1 = {x0, x1, . . . , xT−1}. In general, all symbols are time-varying. In an effort to
present general results while keeping equations clear and concise, we introduce a new
notation to represent a family of equations. We write
x+
t
= Ax + w
to mean that xt+1 = Atxt + wt holds for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. The subscript “+” indicates
that the associated symbol is incremented to t+ 1. We similarly overload summations:
∑
t
xTQx instead of writing
T−1∑
t=0
xTt Qtxt
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Any time we use t above a binary relation or below a summation, it is implied that
0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. The same time horizon T is used throughout this paper.
We denote subvectors by using superscripts so that they are not confused with time
indices. For submatrices, which require double indexing, we will interchangeably use
superscripts and subscripts to minimize clutter. For example, we write P 21+ and A
T
22
to avoid writing P21,+ and A
22,T respectively. We also introduce matrices E1 and E2
to aid in the manipulation of 2 × 2 block matrices. We partition an identity matrix as
I =
[
E1 E2
]
where the dimension of Ei is inferred by context. For example, suppose
B ∈ R(n1+n2)×(m1+m2), with the block-triangular structure given by
B =
[
B11 0
B21 B22
]
where Bij ∈ Rni×mj
then we may write ET2BE1 = B21 and E
T
1B = B11E
T
1 . However, the same symbol
may vary in dimension depending on context. In this case, either Ei ∈ R(n1+n2)×ni or
Ei ∈ R(m1+m2)×mi depending on whether the symbol multiplies B on the left or right,
respectively.
3 Problem statement
Consider two interconnected linear systems with the following state update and measure-
ment equations. [
x1+
x2+
]
t
=
[
A11 0
A21 A22
][
x1
x2
]
+
[
B11 0
B21 B22
][
u1
u2
]
+
[
w1
w2
]
[
y1
y2
]
t
=
[
C11 0
C21 C22
][
x1
x2
]
+
[
v1
v2
] (1)
For brevity, we write the vector (x1t ,x
2
t ) above as simply xt and similarly for yt, ut, wt,
vt. The random vectors in the collection{
x0,
[
w0
v0
]
, . . . ,
[
wT−1
vT−1
]}
(2)
are mutually independent and jointly Gaussian with the following known probability
density functions.
x0 = N (0,Σinit)[
w
v
]
t
= N
(
0,
[
W UT
U V
])
(3)
There are two controllers, and the information available to each controller at time t is
iˆt =
{
y10:t−1,u
1
0:t−1
}
it =
{
y10:t−1,y
2
0:t−1,u
1
0:t−1,u
2
0:t−1
} (4)
The controllers select actions according to control strategies f i := (f i0, f
i
1, . . . , f
i
T−1) for
i = 1, 2. That is,
u1t = f
1
t ( iˆt) and u
2
t = f
2
t ( it) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 (5)
The performance of control strategies f1, f2 is measured by the finite horizon expected
quadratic cost given by
Jˆ0(f1, f2) = Ef
1,f2
(∑
t
[
x
u
]T [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
u
]
+ xTTPfinalxT
)
(6)
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The expectation is taken with respect to the joint probability measure on (x0:T ,u0:T−1)
induced by the choice of f1 and f2. We are interested in the following problem.
Problem 1 (Two-Player LQG). For the model (1)–(5), find control strategies f1, f2
that minimize the cost (6).
A related and well-known problem is the centralized LQG problem. It is the special
case of the two-player problem for which there is a single decision-maker.
Problem 2 (Centralized LQG). Consider the model (1)–(3), where A, B, C are
no longer required to be block-lower-triangular. Suppose ut = ft( it), where it :=
(y0:t−1,u0:t−1), and our goal is to choose f := f0:T−1 such that we minimize
J0(f) = Ef
(∑
t
[
x
u
]T [
Q S
ST R
] [
x
u
]
+ xTTPfinalxT
)
The expectation is with respect to the joint probability measure on (x0:T ,u0:T−1) induced
by the choice of f .
In both Problem 1 and Problem 2, the sizes of the various matrices and vectors
may also vary with time. It is assumed that Σinit, Pfinal, as well as the values of
A,B,C,Q,R, S, U, V,W for all t, are available to all decision-makers for any t ≥ 0. We
also clarify that while we often call the decision-making agents players, this is not a game.
The players are cooperative and their strategies are to be jointly optimized.
4 Structural results
In Problem 1, the lower triangular nature of the state, control and observation matrices
of (1) implies that Player 1’s state and control actions affect Player 2’s information but
not vice versa. Further, any information available of Player 1 is also available to Player 2.
Hence, Problem 1 is partially nested and the optimal strategies for the two players are
linear functions of their respective information histories [3, Thm. 2].
In this section, we show that the information histories can be aggregated into sufficient
statistics. In Sections 5 and 6, we will use this fact to derive a recursive finite-memory
implementation of the optimal controller. We start with a well-known structural result
for the centralized LQG problem (Problem 2).
Lemma 3. In Problem 2, there exists an optimal control strategy of the form u
t
= Kz
where zt := E(xt | it = it), and K0:T−1 are fixed matrices of appropriate dimensions.
We will also make use of some properties of conditional expectations, which apply
because of the nested information. We state the result as a lemma.
Lemma 4. Suppose iˆ and i are information sets that satisfy iˆ ⊂ i. Define conditional
estimates z := E(x | i = i) and zˆ := E(x | iˆ = iˆ ). Then
(i) E( iˆ | i = i ) = iˆ (since iˆ ⊂ i)
(ii) E(z | iˆ = iˆ ) = zˆ (smoothing property)
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4.1 Structural result for Player 2
We now turn our attention to Problem 1. Consider any arbitrary linear strategy for
Player 1. Thus, Player 1’s control actions are of the form
u1
t
= G iˆ (7)
where G0:T−1 are fixed matrices of appropriate dimensions and iˆt is the realization of
Player 1’s information. Given this strategy for Player 1, we want to find the optimal
strategy for Player 2.
In the next two results, we show that once Player 1’s strategy is fixed, finding the
optimal strategy for Player 2 amounts to solving a centralized LQG problem. Thus we
may apply the structural result presented in Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. Consider Problem 1, and assume any fixed strategy for Player 1 given by (7).
Define x¯t as follows.
x¯t :=
[
xt
iˆt
]
, y¯t :=
[
yt
iˆt
]
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Then, the following statements are true.
(i) There exist matrices A¯t, B¯t, C¯t, D¯t such that
x¯0 = N (0,Σinit)
x¯+
t
= A¯x¯ + B¯u2 + D¯
[
w
v
]
y¯
t
= C¯x¯ + v
(ii) There exist matrices Q¯t, R¯t, S¯t, P¯final such that the total expected cost can be written
as
E
(∑
t
[
x¯
u2
]T [
Q¯ S¯
S¯T R¯
] [
x¯
u2
]
+ x¯TT P¯finalx¯T
)
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of x¯t, the state, observation, and cost
equations of Problem 1, and the fixed strategy for Player 1 given by (7).
Theorem 6. Consider Problem 1. For any choice of Player 1’s strategy, the optimal
strategy for Player 2 has the structure
u2
t
= H1 iˆ+H2z (8)
where zt := E(xt | it = it) and iˆt ⊂ it is the realization of Player 1’s information. Further,
zt has a linear update equation that does not depend on the choice of Player 1’s strategy.
This linear update equation is the standard Kalman filter, given explicitly in (15)–(16).
Proof. Lemma 5 implies that when Player 1’s strategy is fixed, the optimization problem
for Player 2 is an instance of the centralized LQG problem (Problem 2) with x¯t as the
state of the linear system, yt as the observation, and u
2
t as the control action. Therefore,
by Lemma 3, the optimal strategy for Player 2 is of the form u2t = Ht E(x¯t | it = it) for
some matrix Ht. Further, it follows from Lemma 4 that
E(x¯t | it = it) =
[
E(xt | it = it)
E( iˆt | it = it)
]
=
[
zt
iˆt
]
(9)
Therefore, the optimal strategy for Player 2 is of the form u2t = Ht E(x¯t | it = it) =
H1t iˆt +H
2
t zt, as required.
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4.2 Joint structural result
We may rewrite the result of Theorem 6 as
u2
t
= u˜2 +H2z (10)
where u˜2t is a linear function of Player 1’s information. Note that u˜
2
t and u
1
t are linear
functions of the same information. In order to further characterize the structure of optimal
strategies, we consider a coordinated system where a coordinator knows the common
information among the players (that is, iˆt) and selects both u˜
2
t and u
1
t based on this
common information. Once the coordinator selects u˜2t , Player 2’s control action is u
2
t =
H2t zt+ u˜
2
t , for some H
2
t . It is clear that any strategy of the form (10) can be implemented
in the coordinated system.
Given an arbitrary choice of H2t , we want to find the optimal strategy for the coordi-
nator. As in Lemma 5, this can be formulated as a centralized LQG problem.
Lemma 7. Consider Problem 1 where u2t is given by (10), and assume any fixed choice
of H2t . Define x˜t as follows.
x˜t :=
[
xt
zt
]
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Then, the following statements are true.
(i) There exist matrices A˜t, B˜t, D˜t, and Σ˜init such that
x˜0 = N (0, Σ˜init)
x˜+
t
= A˜x˜ + B˜
[
u1
u˜2
]
+ D˜
[
w
v
]
y1
t
= C11x
1 + v1
(ii) There exist matrices Ωt and Ωfinal such that the total expected cost can be written as
E
(∑
t
 x˜u1
u˜2
TΩ
 x˜u1
u˜2
+ x˜TT Ωfinal x˜T
)
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of x˜t, the state, observation, and cost
equations of Problem 1, and the fact that zt has a linear update equation. This linear
update equation is the standard Kalman filter, given explicitly in (15)–(16).
Theorem 8. The optimal strategies for the two players in Problem 1 are of the form
u1t = Gtzˆt u
2
t = H
1
t zˆt +H
2
t zt (11)
where zˆt := E(xt | iˆt = iˆt) and zt := E(xt | it = it).
Proof. Lemma 7 implies that when H2t is fixed in (10), the coordinator’s optimization
problem is an instance of Problem 2 with x˜t as the state of the linear system and (u
1
t , u˜
2
t )
as the control action. By Lemma 3, we obtain[
u1t
u˜2t
]
= H˜t E(x˜t | iˆt = iˆt) = H˜t E
([
xt
zt
] ∣∣∣∣ iˆt = iˆt) (12)
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for some matrix H˜t. The first component of the expectation is simply zˆt, and the second
component is also zˆt by Lemma 4. Therefore, u
1
t and u˜
2
t are linear functions of zˆt,
Player 1’s estimate.
Theorem 8 shows that for Problem 1, a sufficient statistic is the set of conditional means
(zˆt, zt). Note that for a given realization of it, Player 2’s estimate zt does not depend on
players’ strategies. However, for a given realization of iˆt, Player 1’s estimate zˆt depends
on the choice of matrices H20:t−1.
4.3 Extension to the POMDP case
In the centralized LQG problem (Problem 2), the fact that the optimal control action
is a linear function of the conditional mean of the state is a consequence of the LQG
assumptions. If state update and measurement equations are nonlinear with non-Gaussian
noise, the centralized problem becomes a partially observable Markov decision process
(POMDP). For POMDPs, optimal actions are functions of the conditional probability
density of the state and not just the conditional mean. In other words:
LQG: ut = Ktzt where zt = E(xt | it = it)
POMDP: ut = φt(pit) where pit = P(xt | it = it)
where φt is a (possibly) nonlinear function, and pit is called the belief state. Note that pit
is a probability density function while zt is simply a real vector.
For the two-player problem (Problem 1), the simple form of the structural results
in Theorems 6 and 8 is a consequence of the triangular information structure and the
LQG assumptions. We now investigate the corresponding two-player structural result for
POMDPs.
A straightforward extension of Lemma 5 shows that for any choice of Player 1’s strategy,
Player 2’s optimization problem is a POMDP and the optimal strategy has the form
u2t = γt(pit, iˆt) where γt is a (possibly) nonlinear function. Because Player 2’s optimal
policy is no longer linear, the coordinator’s problem of Section 4.2 is more complicated.
The coordinator is now required to select a control action for Player 1 and a function that
maps Player 2’s belief to Player 2’s action. The coordinator’s problem can be viewed as
a POMDP with (xt,pit) as the state. Therefore, the associated structural result involves
a belief on the pair (xt,pit). Not only is the coordinator required to keep a belief on the
state, it must also keep a belief on Player 2’s belief on the state.
As shown in Section 4, the structures of the optimal strategies for the centralized and
two-player problems in the LQG case are of comparable complexity. However, this is
not the case for the nonlinear, non-Gaussian versions of these problems. The centralized
case requires maintaining a belief on the system state, while the two-player case requires
maintaining a belief on a belief. This is substantially more complicated object.
5 Explicit solution
In this section, we use the structural results of Section 4 to derive an explicit and efficiently
computable state-space realization for the optimal controller for Problem 1.
To ensure a unique optimal controller with a recursively computable structure, we make
some additional mild assumptions, which we list below.
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Main assumptions. We assume the following.[
W UT
U V
]
t≥ 0, Σinit ≥ 0, and V
t
> 0 (13)[
Q S
ST R
]
t≥ 0, Pfinal ≥ 0, and R
t
> 0 (14)
The assumptions that Vt > 0 and Rt > 0 are made for simplicity and can generally be
relaxed. For example, it is only required that CtΣtC
T
t + Vt > 0, so as long as this holds,
we can have Vt ≥ 0.
The well-known solution to the centralized LQG problem (Problem 2) in given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 9. Consider Problem 2 and suppose the main assumptions (13)–(14) hold. The
optimal policy is
z0 = 0
z+
t
= Az +Bu− L(y − Cz)
u
t
= Kz
(15)
where L0:T−1 satisfies the forward recursion
Σ0 = Σinit
Σ+
t
= AΣAT + L(CΣAT + U) +W
L
t
= −(AΣCT + UT)(CΣCT + V )−1
(16)
and K0:T−1 satisfies the backward recursion
PT = Pfinal
P
t
= ATP+A+ (A
TP+B + S)K +Q
K
t
= −(BTP+B +R)−1(BTP+A+ ST)
(17)
For every t, the belief state has the distribution
P(xt | it = it) = N (zt,Σt) (18)
and the optimal average cost is given by
J0 = tr(P0Σinit) +
∑
t
(
tr(P+W ) + tr
[
ΣKT(BTP+B +R)K
] )
(19)
Proof. See for example [4] or [12].
Note that Lemma 9 holds in great generality. All system, cost, and covariance matrices
may vary with time. The above formulae hold even in the case where the dimensions of
the matrices are different at every timestep.
The main result of this section is a state-space solution to Problem 1, the two-player
problem. The result, given below in Theorem 10, is similar in structure and generality to
Lemma 9, but with one important difference. In Lemma 9, the gains K0:T−1 and L0:T−1
can be computed separately using different recursions. Thus, Lemma 9 provides both a so-
lution and a recipe for its construction. In contrast, the recursions for Kˆ0:T−1 and Lˆ0:T−1
found in Theorem 10 are coupled. Therefore, Theorem 10 provides an implicitly defined
solution, but no obvious construction method. In Section 6, we make our solution explicit
by showing how the various gains described in Theorem 10 can be efficiently computed.
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Theorem 10. Consider Problem 1 and suppose the main assumptions (13)–(14) hold.
The optimal policy is
zˆ0 = 0
zˆ+
t
= Azˆ +Buˆ− Lˆ(y − Czˆ)
uˆ
t
= Kzˆ
(20)
z0 = 0
z+
t
= Az +Bu− L(y − Cz)
u
t
= Kzˆ + Kˆ(z − zˆ)
(21)
where L0:T−1 and K0:T−1 satisfy (16)–(17). If we define Aˆ :
t
= A+BKˆ+ LˆC, then Lˆ0:T−1
satisfies the recursion
Σˆ0 = Σinit
Σˆ+
t
= Σ+ + Aˆ(Σˆ− Σ)AˆT + (Lˆ− L)(CΣCT + V )(Lˆ− L)T
Lˆ
t
= −(AΣˆCT + UT +BKˆ(Σˆ− Σ)CT)E1(C11Σˆ11CT11 + V11)−1ET1
(22)
and Kˆ0:T−1 satisfies the recursion
PˆT = Pfinal
Pˆ
t
= P + AˆT(Pˆ+ − P+)Aˆ+ (Kˆ −K)T(BTP+B +R)(Kˆ −K)
Kˆ
t
= −E2(BT22Pˆ 22+ B22 +R22)−1ET2
(
BTPˆ+A+ S
T +BT(Pˆ+ − P+)LˆC
) (23)
where Ei are matrices defined in Section 2. For every t, the belief states have the distri-
butions
P(xt | iˆt = iˆt) = N (zˆt, Σˆt)
P(xt | it = it) = N (zt,Σt)
(24)
and the optimal average cost is given by
Jˆ0 = tr(P0Σinit) +
∑
t
(
tr(P+W ) + tr
[
ΣKT(BTP+B +R)K
]
+ tr
[
(Σˆ− Σ)(Kˆ −K)T(BTP+B +R)(Kˆ −K)
])
(25)
Proof. Note that LˆE2 = 0 and E
T
1 Kˆ = 0. That is, the second block-column of Lˆ and
the first block-row of Kˆ are zero. The required triangular structure is therefore satisfied
because zˆ+ only depends on y
1 in (20) and u1 only depends on zˆ in (21).
Since Player 2 observes all measurements and control actions, its estimate of the state
is the standard Kalman filter. Therefore, zt evolves according to (21) where L0:T−1
satisfies (16).
The result of Theorem 8 implies that the optimal control vector can be expressed as
u
t
= u˜+ Kˆz where u˜t is chosen by the coordinator and Kˆt is a matrix whose first block-
row is zero, so ET1 Kˆt = 0. Our first step will be to fix Kˆt for all t and to optimize for
the coordinator’s strategy. We begin by computing zˆt = E(xt | iˆt = iˆt). To this end,
we construct an equivalent centralized problem and appeal once again to Lemma 9. By
Lemma 4, we have zˆt = E(zt | iˆt = iˆt) so we may estimate xt by estimating zt instead.
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Substituting the definitions for ut and yt into (1) and (21), we obtain the state equations[
z+
e+
]
t
=
[
A+BKˆ −LC
0 A+ LC
] [
z
e
]
+
[
B
0
]
u˜ +
[ −Lv
w + Lv
]
y1
t
=
[
ET1 C E
T
1 C
] [z
e
]
+ v1
where we have defined the error signal e :
t
= x − z. Apply Lemma 9 to compute the
Σ-recursion. A straightforward induction argument shows that the covariance and gain
matrices that satisfy (16) at time t are given by[
Σˆt − Σt 0
0 Σt
]
and
[
LˆtE1
0
]
where Σˆt and Lˆt satisfy (22). Computing the estimation equations (15), we find that the
estimate of et is 0, and
zˆ+
t
= Aˆzˆ +Bu˜− Lˆy (26)
where Aˆ is defined in the theorem statement. State and input split into conditionally
independent parts [
x
u
]
t
=
[
z
u˜ + Kˆz
]
+
[
e
0
]
so the only relevant part of the cost (6) is
E
(∑
t
[
z
u˜ + Kˆz
]T [
Q S
ST R
] [
z
u˜ + Kˆz
]
+ zTTPfinalzT
)
Applying the P -recursion (17) from Lemma 9 to solve for u˜, we find after some algebra
that
u˜
t
= (K − Kˆ)zˆ (27)
where K0:T−1 is the centralized gain given by (17). Substituting (27) into (26), we recover
the desired form for Player 1’s estimator (20).
We have shown thus far that for any fixed Kˆt, the optimal Player 1 estimator has the
form specified in (20), where (22), and (24) hold and the coordinator’s action is given
by (27). Note that since the first block-row of Kˆt is zero, it follows from (27) that
u1
t
= ET1Kzˆ where K0:T−1 is the centralized gain. Therefore, the optimal strategies for
the two players have the following structure:
zˆ0 = 0
zˆ+
t
= (A+BK)zˆ − Lˆ(y − Czˆ)
u1
t
= ET1Kzˆ
(28)
z0 = 0
z+
t
= Az +Bu− L(y − Cz)
u2
t
= ET2Kzˆ + E
T
2 Kˆ(z − zˆ)
(29)
for some Lˆ0:T−1 and Kˆ0:T−1. Because our problem is partially nested, a strategy of the
form (28)–(29) is globally optimal if and only if it is person by person optimal.
For a given Kˆ0:T−1, Player 1’s strategy of the form (28) will coincide with the coordi-
nator’s best response to Kˆ0:T−1 if Lˆ0:T−1 satisfies (22). Therefore, a strategy of the form
(28) with Lˆ0:T−1 satisfying (22) must be Player 1’s best response to Kˆ0:T−1. For a given
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choice of Lˆ0:T−1, we now seek the best response of Player 2 of the form in (29). The
combined control vector of the two players can be written as u
t
= Kzˆ + E2u¯, where we
allow u¯ to be a function of player 2’s entire information. Gathering the state equations (1)
and the estimator equations (20)–(21), we obtain[
x+
eˆ+
]
t
=
[
A+BK −BK
0 A+LˆC
][
x
eˆ
]
+
[
BE2
BE2
]
u¯ +
[
w
w + Lˆv
]
y
t
=
[
C 0
] [x
eˆ
]
+ v
where we have defined the error signal eˆ :
t
= x− zˆ. The cost (6) is given by
E
(∑
t
[
x
Kzˆ + E2u¯
]T[
Q S
ST R
][
x
Kzˆ + E2u¯
]
+ xTTPfinalxT
)
where the correct coordinates can be obtained by by substituting zˆ
t
= x− eˆ. Now apply
Lemma 9 to compute the P -recursion. A straightforward induction argument shows that
the cost-to-go and gain matrices that satisfy (17) at time t are given by[
Pt 0
0 Pˆt − Pt
]
and
[
0 ET2 Kˆt
]
where Pˆt and Kˆt satisfy (23). It follows from Lemma 9 that the optimal input is
u¯t =
[
0 ET2 Kˆt
] [E(xt | it = it)
E(eˆt | it = it)
]
= ET2 Kˆt(zt − zˆt)
Despite allowing u¯t to depend on the full measurement history it, we find that it only
depends on (zt − zˆt), so that Player 2’s best response is of the form (29).
Thus, Kˆ0:T−1, Lˆ0:T−1 satisfying (22) and (23) constitute a person-by-person optimal,
and consequently, a globally optimal solution of our problem.
Corollary 11 (Nonzero initial state). If the initial state for Problems 1 and 2 is changed
to x0 = N (µinit,Σinit), then Lemma 9 and Theorem 10 change as follows.
(i) Estimators initialized at z0 = zˆ0 = µinit.
(ii) Costs J0 and Jˆ0 each increased by µTinitP0µinit.
Proof. Add a pre-initial timestep x−1 = N (0, I) with trivial dynamics A−1 = C−1 = I,
B−1 = 0 and apply the zero-initial-mean result to the augmented system.
6 Efficient computation
Theorem 10 provides a state-space realization for the two-player problem similar to
Lemma 9, with an important difference. In Lemma 9, the recursions (16) and (17) can
be solved independently by propagating time forward or backward respectively. However,
the recursions (22)–(23) are coupled in an intricate way. Both Pˆ and Σˆ recursions con-
tain Aˆ, which depends on Kˆ and Lˆ. Furthermore, the equations for Kˆ contains Lˆ and
vice-versa.
Despite being nonlinear difference equations coupled across all timesteps, the recur-
sions (22)–(23) can be solved efficiently. In the following theorem, we show that the
equations for Σˆ, Pˆ , Lˆ, Kˆ can be reduced to a linear two-point boundary-value problem
and thereby solved as efficiently as (16)–(17).
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Theorem 12. In the solution to Problem 1 given by (20)–(21), the gains Lˆ0:T−1, Kˆ0:T−1
are of the form
Lˆ
t
=
[
M 0
Lˆ21 0
]
and Kˆ
t
=
[
0 0
Kˆ21 J
]
where M0:T−1 satisfies the forward recursion
Γ0 = Σ
11
init
Γ+
t
= A11ΓA
T
11 +M(C11ΓA
T
11 + U11) +W11
M
t
= −(A11ΓCT11 + UT11)(C11ΓCT11 + V11)−1
(30)
and J0:T−1 satisfies the backward recursion
FT = P
22
final
F
t
= AT22F+A22 + (A
T
22F+B22 + S22)J +Q22
J
t
= −(BT22F+B22 +R22)−1(BT22F+A22 + ST22)
(31)
Finally, Σˆ210:T , Lˆ
21
0:T , Pˆ
21
0:T−1, Kˆ
21
0:T−1 satisfy the coupled forward and backward recursions
Σˆ210 = Σ
21
init
Σˆ21+
t
= AJ Σˆ
21ATM +B22Kˆ
21(Γ− Σ11)ATM +
(
A21Γ−B22JΣ21
)
ATM + U
T
12M
T +W21
Lˆ21
t
= −
[
AJ Σˆ
21CT11 +B22Kˆ
21(Γ− Σ11)CT11 + (A21Γ−B22JΣ21)CT11 + UT12
]
× (C11ΓCT11 + V11)−1
(32)
Pˆ 21T = P
21
final
Pˆ 21
t
= ATJ Pˆ
21
+ AM +A
T
J(F+ − P 22+ )Lˆ21C11 +ATJ
(
F+A21 − P 21+ MC11
)
+ JTST12 +Q21
Kˆ21
t
= −(BT22F+B22 +R22)−1
×
[
BT22Pˆ
21
+ AM +B
T
22(F+ − P 22+ )Lˆ21C11 + ST12 +BT22(F+A21 − P 21+ MC11)
]
(33)
where AM :
t
= A11 +MC11 and AJ :
t
= A22 +B22J .
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 10 and some straightforward algebra, so we
omit the details. The recursions (30) and (31) are obtained by simplifying the 11 block
of (22) and the 22 block of (23), respectively. Finally, the recursions (32) and (33) are
obtained by simplifying the 21 blocks of (22) and (23) respectively.
Theorem 12 reduces the coupled recursions found in Theorem 10 to a two-point linear
boundary value problem. From a computational standpoint, computing the matrices
Lt, Mt, Kt, Jt using (16)–(17) and (30)–(31) requires recursing through the entire time
horizon. This requires O(T ) operations.
It turns out that Σˆ21t , Pˆ
21
t , Lˆ
21
t , Kˆ
21
t (and consequently Lˆt and Kˆt) can also be computed
in O(T ). To see why, note that (32)–(33) are of the form
Σˆ210 = Σ
21
init Pˆ
21
T = P
21
final
Σˆ21+
t
= g1(Σˆ
21, Kˆ21) Pˆ 21
t
= g2(Pˆ
21
+ , Lˆ
21)
Lˆ21
t
= g3(Σˆ
21, Kˆ21) Kˆ21
t
= g4(Pˆ
21
+ , Lˆ
21)
(34)
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where g1, . . . , g4 are affine functions. Eliminating Lˆ
21
t and Kˆ
21
t from (34) using the last
row of equations,
Σˆ210 = Σ
21
init Pˆ
21
T = P
21
final
Σˆ21+
t
= h1(Σˆ
21, Pˆ 21+ ) Pˆ
21 t= h2(Σˆ
21, Pˆ 21+ )
(35)
where h1 and h2 are affine functions. Now let
η :
t
=
[
vec Pˆ 21
vec Σˆ21+
]
where vecX is the vector obtained by stacking the columns of X. Then (35) is a block-
tridiagonal system of the form
I H1
G1 I
. . .
. . .
. . . HT−1
GT−1 I


η0
η1
...
ηT−1
 =

c0
c1
...
cT−1

for some constant matrices G1:T−1 and H1:T−1 and a constant vector c0:T−1. Equations
of this form can be solved in O(T ) using for example block tridiagonal LU factorization [2,
§ 4.5.1].
Therefore, the optimal controller for the two-player problem presented in Theorem 10
can be computed with comparable effort to its centralized counterpart in Lemma 9.
Note that the infinite-horizon two-player problem can be solved by making suitable
assumptions on the system parameters and taking limits in Theorem 12. The recur-
sions (16)–(17) and (30)–(31) become algebraic Riccati equations, and the coupled recur-
sions (34) become a small set of linear equations.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we used a coordinator-based approach to derive a new structural result for
a two-player partially nested LQG problem. Our results generalize those from classical
LQG theory in a very intuitive way. Rather than maintaining a single estimate of the
state, two different estimates must be maintained, to account for the two different sets of
information available. As in the centralized case, finding the optimal two-player controller
requires solving forward and backward recursions for estimation and control respectively.
The key difference is that the recursions for the two-player case are coupled and must
be solved together. We show that these recursions can be solved as efficiently as in the
centralized case, with complexity proportional to the length of the time horizon.
An effort was made to express our results in a form that showcases the duality between
estimation and control. This duality is apparent in (22)–(23), (30)–(33), and in the proof
of Theorem 10. The extent of the duality observed in the solution is perhaps unexpected.
Indeed, one might expect a greater burden on the second player since it receives more
measurements and must correct for the estimation errors inevitably made by the first
player. However, from a different perspective, one might expect a greater burden on
the first player since it has more control authority and must act to influence states of
the system that the second player cannot control. The second player’s lack of control
authority mirrors the first player’s lack of estimation ability.
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